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ARTICLE
ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADJUSTING
PRISONER CENSUS DATA IN CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING: MARYLAND'S TEST CASE

By: Michelle Davis*

The issue of prisoner populations in redistricting presented itself for
the first time on a national scale this redistricting cycle. Columbia
University School of Law professor Nathaniel Persily was one of the first
to predict a critical mass in a movement that had long subsisted in the
backwater of voter advocacy circles, taking a backseat to more
cognizable campaigns for voter access and non-discrimination. He
observed in a recent Cardozo Law Review article, "[h]ow and where the
census counts prisoners is likely to be the subject of much debate
surrounding the 2010 Census."}
In most states prisoners cannot vote? Maryland is one of the majority
of states that denies the franchise to inmates? The movement to count
prisoners at their previous residences however, does not center on
prisoner rights, instead it focuses on the representation rights of the
communities that those prisoners come from. The crux of the argument
in favor of the practice is that most inmates are displaced residents from
urban communities incarcerated in institutions mostly located in rural
areas. 4 Most states, with no way of knowing exactly how many prisoners
the U.S. Census counted or their previous addresses, would count an
entire prison inmate population toward the total population of a U.S.
Congressional or legislative district. s For example, the Commissioner
Districts in Somerset County, Maryland, includes one African-American

* Michelle Davis, J.D., is a Senior Policy Analyst for the Maryland Department of
Legislative Services
1 Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count,
and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 755, 786 (2011).
2 The Sentencing Project, The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United
States (Oct. 1998), http://www.sentencingproject.orgldoclFileIFVRlfd_Iosingthevote.pdf.
3 MD. GEN. ASSEMB.,WAYS AND MEANS COMM., DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERV., Fiscal and Policy
Note, H.B. 603,(2006).
4 Persily, supra note 1, at 787.
5 ld. Before the 2010 census, this data was known as the "Advanced Group Quarters Table."
ld. at 788, n. 123. Such data was released after the redistricting data and thus was not
available for use by states. Id.787-88.
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majority district; however, less than 34% of its population is eligible to
vote; the rest are inmates of the Eastern Correctional Institution. 6
Election districts all over the country are replete with examples of
what has come to be known as the "prison gerrymandering" effect. 7 In
general, political districts with prisons located within them significantly
reduce the number of eligible voters in that district compared to districts
without these large prison institutions. This disparity in eligible voter
populations produces several distortions that affect voting rights. First,
the most basic claim of prison gerrymandering opponents is that it
distorts relative voting power, that is, votes in prison districts weigh more
than votes from non-prison districts. 8 For instance, a vote in Somerset
County's Commissioner District 1 prior to Maryland's prisoner
reallocation law was worth 2.7 times that of votes in neighboring
districts. 9 A similar rationale informed the U.S. Supreme Court's
reasoning as it formulated its now famous "one person, one vote line" of
cases:
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting
power of another person in a state-wide election merely because
he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural
county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is
to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are
to have an equal vote [... ]. This is required by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
Second, the distortion does not affect individual voters alone, prison
gerrymandering gives more representation in the legislature to certain
regions within a state. I I Typically, rural regions with less overall
population and a large prisoner population are over-represented versus
their more urban counterparts. That is, many cities lose much of their
6 See generally No Representation Without Population Act: Hearing on S.B. 400 Before the S.
Educ., Health, & Envtl. Affairs Comm., Illth Congo (2010) (written statement of the

Maryland American Civil Liberties Union discussing Somerset County's 1985 consent decree
under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 creating commissioner district I as a remedial
African-American majority-minority district).

The Census Count and Prisons: the Problem, the Solutions and
What the Census Can Do (Oct. 4, 2010),

7 PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,

http://www.demos.org/sites/defaultifiles/publicationsIFACTSHEET_PBG_WhatCensusCanD
o_Demos. pdf (hereinafter "The Census Count and Prisons"). One of the more extreme
examples offered by the Prison Policy Initiative is the city of Anamosa, Iowa. A candidate for
city council won a seat after a total of two (write-in) votes were cast. In Anamosa, 96% of the
district was comprised of prisoners incarcerated in a nearby prison. Id.

sId.
See generally No Representation Without Population Act: Hearing on S.B. 400 Before the S.
Educ., Health, & Envtl. Affairs Comm., Illth Congo (2010) (statement of Peter Wagner, Exec.
9

Dir. Prison Policy Inst.).
10 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
II The Census Count and Prisons, supra note 7.
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census population to prisons in rural districts and thus suffer less
representation in the state legislature as a result. Persily described it this
way:
The counting of prisoners in prison can create dramatic disparities
between districts in their numbers of eligible voters. In some
state legislative districts, for example, over ten percent of the
population resides in prison. The disparities can be even greater
at the local level. In twenty-one counties in the country, over
twenty percent of the population is in prison, leading to huge
variations in eligible voter populations between districts. 12
Third, and even more intriguing, is the question of whether the distortion
caused by counting prisoners as residents of the institutions they are
incarcerated in implicates the Voting Rights Act. As Persily notes, the
counting of prisoners can also have a racially disparate impact: "[i]n
several states, such as New York and Illinois, the prison population is
heavily minority and from urban centers, while prisons are located in
rural, largely white counties.,,13
Maryland has large prison institutions in Western Maryland and on the
Eastern Shore. Hagerstown Correctional Institution's prison population
comprises nearly 14% of the population of State Legislative District 2C. 14
The prison population of the Eastern Correctional Institution in Somerset
County makes up 7% of Legislative Sub-District 38A. 15 Much of the
population gains of Western Maryland and the Eastern Shore from these
prison populations have been at the expense of Baltimore City, which has
been losing representation in the State Legislature since the 1980'S.16
Persily, supra note 1, at 787.
Id.
14 See Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4 at 7, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011)
(ECF No. 33-5) (hereinafter "Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4"); see also STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF
PLANNING, REpORT OF MD. PRECINCT POPULATION DATA: 2010 CENSUS, ADJUSTED MD.
REDISTRICTING DATA & UNADJUSTED CENSUS POPULATION COUNT, App. 8-1 (2010)
(hereinafter "MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING"). Census 2010 data showed 6,127 prisoners in the
Hagerstown facility and a total (unadjusted) population of 43,292 in the state's 2002
Legislative Sub-District 2C, where the Hagerstown facility is located. See Karl Aro Dec\. Ex.
4 at 7.
15 See MD. DEP'TOF PLANNING, supra note 14, at App. 8-1. Census 2010 data showed 3,254
prisoners in the Eastern Correctional facility and a total (unadjusted) population of 45,791 in
the state's 2002 Legislative Sub-District 2C where the facility is located. See Karl Aro Decl.,
supra note 14, at 7; see also MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, supra note 14, at App. B-1.
16 See generally Legislative Election Districts, MD. GEN. ASSEMB. (2012), available at
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanuaIl07Ieg/map/htmllmap.html. Baltimore City's
representation in the legislature has steadily declined over the past few decades. In 1992,
Baltimore City comprised all or part of eight legislative districts. See STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF
PLANNING, MD. 1992 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (2012), available at
http://www.mdp.state.md.usIMSDClRedistlLegd92/92ldmdid.htm.In 2002, it was only
included in 6 districts, and only 5.2 districts in 2012. See STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING,
MD. 2002 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (2012), available at
12
13
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Dale Ho, Assistant Counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, suggested in a 2011 Stanford Law & Policy Review
article that prison gerrymandering could be characterized as a minority
vote dilution claim under Section Two of the 1964 Voting Rights ACt. 17
Heretofore, Section Two claims have followed a fairly structured legal
test under Thornburg v. Gingles, which requires the existence of specific
factors that pin a plaintiffs success on whether a remedy is available. IS
Historically, that remedy has been the creation of a majority-minority
district to protect minority representation rights. 19 In the context of
prisoner gerrymandering however, the remedy would encompass
reallocating prisoners back to their previous residences and potentially
equalizing the relative voting power between communities with and
without prisoner populations. 2o Despite a general recognition of prisoner
populations as an issue for redistricting in 2010, and a few scholarly
musings about the legal theories a court might apply to the effects of
prison gerrymandering, there were several key events leading up to
Maryland's 2010 passage of its prisoner reallocation law.
A key to educating the public and drawing attention to the prisoner
problem in representation has been the Prison Policy Initiative. 21 This
ten-year old non-profit organization seeks to document "how mass
incarceration skews democracy.,,22
The issue arose when prison
population growth in the United States contributed to increased distortion
in state and 10callegislatures. 23 The group cites Anamosa, Iowa, where a
prison makes up nearly 100% of a local city council district, as its most
compelling example of the unfairness of counting prison populations
within one district. 24 Thus, only a handful of voters control the
representation of an entire city council seat. 25 While the effects of the
practice are not this dramatic in most jurisdictions, it impacts varying
degrees of representational rights in nearly every state.

http://www.mdp.state.md.usIPDF/OurProductslRedistrictl20021d_ courtappeals_62102_MD_
map_web.pdf; see STATE OF MD. DEP'TOF PLANNING, MD. 2012 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

(2012), available at
http://planning.maryland.govIPDFlRedistrictingl2010mapslLegiStatewide.pdf.
17 Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current
Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 355, 388 (2011).
18 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986).
19 Id. at 76.
20 Ho, supra note 17, at 387-88.
21 See generally PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org (last visited Sept. 29,
2012).
22

23
24
25

Id.
Id.
The Census Count and Prisons, supra note 7.
Id.
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Although the sudden popularity of prisoner reallocation this
redistricting cycle was greatly influenced by a groundswell of support
from good government advocacy groups, the key to its success was a
more practical one. The United States Census Bureau's operational
decision to make the requisite data available to rectify the prison problem
made prison reallocation possible?6 This was undoubtedly a response to
advocates hoping to end prisoner gerrymandering.27 In April of2011, the
Census Bureau announced that it would, for the first time, make detailed
prison population data from its 20 I 0 census count available in time for
decennial redistricting activity in the states. 28 This "group-quarters" data
would allow states and localities to identify prisons according to their
locations within census geography, and obtain detailed demographic
information about the prisoner population. 29
This policy change by the Census Bureau was made in spite of many
pleas by the advocacy community and other stakeholders to end its policy
of counting prisoners as residents of the prisons. 3o However, the Census
Bureau insists that after much research and deliberation, changing its
practice would be too cumbersome and expensive to implement. 3l In its
view, ascertaining the previous addresses of prisoners was beyond the
scope of Census Bureau operations. 32
Where the Census Bureau created "opportunity," the Second Circuit
created legal legitimacy when it mentioned prison gerrymandering in the
2006 decision Hayden v. Pataki. 33 Hayden involved an unsuccessful
2010 Census Advance Group Quarters Summary File, Census of Population and Housing,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU I-I (Apr. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/gqsf.pdf; see
Peter Wagner, Census Bureau Releases Group Quarters Data, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS
BLOO (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2012/10/26/nacreoptestimony.
27 See Wagner, supra note 26.
28 2010 Census Advance Group Quarters Summary File, supra note 26, at I-I. In the past,
this data file would be distributed long after most states completed redistricting. See Wagner,
supra note 26.
29 See generally 2010 Census Advance Group Quarters Summary File, supra note 26, at G-2
(stating that the residence rule is used to determine where people should be counted during the
census, and that people who do not have a usual residence (or cannot be determined), a usual
residence should be counted based on their current location).
30 See, e.g., The Problem, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS,
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orglimpact.html(last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
31 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABULATINO PRISONERS AT THEIR "PERMANENT HOME OF
RECORD" ADDRESS, 1-2 (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://
http://www.census.gov/newsroomlreleases/pdf/2006-02-21_tabulating-.prisoners.pdf
("Counting prisoners at a 'permanent home of record' address, rather than at their place of
incarceration, would result in increased cost both to the decennial census program and to the
federal, state, and local correctional facilities that would be required to participate in data
collection efforts. Our study raises concerns that this change would result in decreased
accuracy for a possibly large proportion of millions of individuals confined on Census day. ").
32 The Census Count and Prisons, supra note 7, at G-2.
33 Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305,341-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (en bane).
26
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challenge to New York's felon disenfranchisement law. 34 In this case, the
plaintiffs represented a class of Black and Latino incarcerated felons and
parolees in New York state prisons who claimed that the state statutes
disenfranchising them are covered by the Voting Rights Act, and those
statutes violated Section Two of the Act by diluting minority voting
power. 35 The Second Circuit, sitting en bane, affirmed the lower court's
holding that the Voting Rights Act did not cover New York's
disenfranchisement law, but the court pondered an issue not explicitly
raised by the plaintiffs:
It is unclear whether plaintiffs' vote dilution claim also

encompasses a claim on behalf of plaintiffs who are neither
incarcerated nor on parole, that their votes are "diluted" because
of New York's apportionment process, [ ... ], which counts
incarcerated prisoners as residents of the communities in which
they are incarcerated, and has the alleged effect of increasing
upstate New York regions' populations at the expense of New
York City's. Plaintiffs' complaint does not raise this claim
explicitly, though it is briefly alluded to in their submissions
before this Court. 36
Without briefs or any consideration of this issue by the District Court, the
majority opinion ordered the case be remanded to consider this issue. 37 A
trial never resumed on remand after plaintiffs declined to go any further
with the claim, but the few lines written by the Second Circuit Court
appeared to gamer national attention. 38 In May 2006, a New York Times
editorial lauded the court for recognizing the issue. 39 For advocacy
groups, the court's musings became a clarion call for reform. 4o
The Supreme Court interpreted the United States Census Act to
require use of the 100% decennial census count for purposes of
apportioning the United States House of Representatives, rather than
implementing statistical sampling and other survey data products
provided by the Census Bureau. 41 This bright-line rule does not apply to
ld.
Id. at 311.
36 Id. at 328-29 (citing N.Y. CaNST. art. III, § 4).
37 Hayden, 449 F.3d at 329.
38 Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2006 WL 2242760 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006).
39 Editorial, Prison-Based Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,2006), available at
http://www.nytimes.coml2006/05/20/opinionl20sat3.html?J= I.
40 New York to End Prisoner Gerrymandering, PRO SE (Prisoners' Legal Services of New
York), Summer 2010, at 3, available at http://www.plsny.orgiPro_Se_-_8-25.pdf.
41 Persily, supra note I, at 758-60. In Dept. o/Commerce v. u.s. House 0/ Representatives,
the court found that 13 U.S.C. § 195 prohibits the use of statistical sampling for purposes of
reapportioning the U.S. House of Representatives under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. H.R., II F.Supp.2d 76,79 (D.D.C. 1999); see
34

35
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the data distributed to states for redistricting purposes. 42 When it comes
to redistricting, which is performed at the state level, the overwhelming
convention by states is to use the same unadjusted census data produced
by the Census Bureau for Congressional apportionment. 43 Thus, by
default, most jurisdictions use total population as the base from which it
redraws electoral lines. 44 However, unlike Congressional apportionment,
there is no legal precedent providing a bright-line rule that defines a
"constitutionally acceptable" population base for redistricting purposes. 45
Indeed, there are many potential population bases: voting age population,
citizen population, registered voters, residents, nonfelons and more, some
of which involving tweaking census data. 46 Since 1988, Kansas has
routinely modified census total population data by extracting college
students and military non-residents for legislative redistricting. 47
Hayden seemed to open the door to the idea that prison populations
could substantially affect representational rights, but Federal courts
remained silent on the question of excluding or moving prisoners in the
redistricting process until the Fourth Circuit Court's decision in Fletcher
v. Lamone. 48 The U.S. Supreme Court and various federal circuits over
the years have sparingly meandered into the political thicket to consider
the use of undercount estimates, voter registration rolls, and citizen voting
age population data. 49 The two recurring themes in each of these
scenarios seem to be the availability and reliability of the data used; and
the resulting difference between the adjusted and the traditional data set. 50
Generally, courts have given the states wide discretion when engaging
Until 1964, the question of courts
in political line-drawing. 51
adjudicating a state's congressional or legislative district map was
generally u.s. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
(Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/survey_ methodology/acs_design_methodology.
pdf. There is some debate on what constitutes sampling. See generally Persily, supra note I,
at 758 (discussing the debate on "sampling").
42 Persily, supra note I, at 759.
43 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, II (2009).
44

See id.

45
46

Persily, supra note I, at 763.
Id.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-301-2 (2001).
See generally Hayden, 449 F.3d at 341-42; see generally Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp.
2d 887 (D. Md. 20 II). However, Federal courts have heard cases centering on other types of
adjusted Census data and alternate datasets. See generally Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.

47

48

222 (1985).
See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) ("Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket.").
50 See REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43 at THE CENSUS, 10 (2009) ("Federal courts
have upheld the use of alternative population bases for redistricting if the alternative database
is used uniformly and if the results are comparable to those produced by a census populationbased plan.").
51 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552.

49
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considered to be one of a "peculiarly political nature" outside of the
court's jurisdiction. 52 After the court's turnaround in Baker v. Carr, it
embraced jurisdiction for violations of the constitution. 53 However, the
Court did not preempt the entire redistricting process:
"From the beginning, we have recognized that reapportionment is
primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination,
and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional
requisites [ ... ]." 54
Since Baker, the Supreme Court has delved deeper into redistricting
controversies, and it has recognized census data as the "best population
data available" for purposes of redistricting. 55 But, the Court has
emphasized that it is the accuracy and reliability of the data that is
dispositive in those cases, not its status as official census data. 56 In
Karcher, the Supreme Court rejected deviations in New Jersey's
Congressional district populations meant to correct for the census
While the court recognized a confirmed historical
undercount. 57
undercount in censuses throughout the years, and acknowledged New
Jersey's right to correct for that when redistricting, the process by which
it accomplishes that must produce reliable, accurate results. 58 Adjusting
census data reliably and accurately requires execution of a coherent, welldocumented and even-handed policy. In Karcher, New Jersey linedrawers had attempted to compensate for a 1% census undercount by
allowing for deviations between districts of 1%.59 Of course, this did
nothing to reduce the overall undercount of individuals in the state or
between districts. 60 The court underscored the need for states to carefully
tailor adjustments to census data to so that it actually improves the
accuracy of population totals:
Unless some systematic effort is made to correct the distortions
inherent in census counts of total population, deviations from the
norm of population equality are far more likely to exacerbate the
Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
54 White, 412 U.S. at 794.
55 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969».
56 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 738.
57 Jd. at 731.
58 Jd. at 741.
59 See id. at 740 (stating that the plan did not come "as nearly as practicable to population
equality").
60 Jd. at 736.
52

53
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differences between districts. If a State does attempt to use a
measure other than total population or to "correct" the census
figures, it may not do so in a haphazard, inconsistent, or
conjectural manner.6!
As early as 1966, the Supreme Court grudgingly upheld a Hawaiian
legislative apportionment plan based on the state's registered voters
instead of the Census Bureau's total population counts. 62 The reasoning
behind the use of this alternate population group was Hawaii's unique
concentration of non-resident military personne1. 63 While the Court
upheld the plan, it did so with the clear caveat that the voter database
"substantially" resembled Hawaii's total citizen population. 64 The Court
noted that the registered voter database was not, by definition, a
permissible dataset since it "depends not only upon criteria such as
govern state citizenship, but also upon the extent of political activity of
those eligible to register and vote.,,65 Burns clearly warned against future
use of such alternative population bases, given the strong correlation
needed between a registered voter database and more acceptable
population datasets. 66 "Weare not to be understood as deciding that the
validity of the registered voters basis as a measure has been established
for all time or circumstances, in Hawaii or elsewhere.,,67 Indeed, in 1982,
a federal district court found that registered voters in Hawaii no longer
approximated the citizen population total and overturned a legislative
plan based on that data. 68
Three years after the United States Supreme Court upheld Hawaii's
state senate districts, the Court affirmed the District Court for the Western
District of Missouri ruling, which struck down Missouri's 1967
Redistricting Act. 69 The redistricting map featured population variances
Missouri's main
above 3% between Congressional districts. 70
justification had been that the deviations accounted for large military
populations in some areas of the state, just as had been the case in
Hawaii. 7! However, the Court found the Missouri Legislature'S methods
lacking, calling its redistricting process "haphazard.,,72 Missouri had not

61

62

63
64

65
66
67

68
69
70

71
72

See id. at 744 (quoting Kirkpatrick. 394 U.S. at 534-35 (1969)).
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,97-98 (1966).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 96.
Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp 554, 572 (D. Haw. 1982).
See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
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used voter registration records as was done in Hawaii, but simply made
"adjustments" to the total population data, something the court found to
be too unreliable. 73
More recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
question of using citizen voting age population as the basis for
redistricting. 74 In Chen v. City of Houston, the Plaintiffs sued the City of
Houston's apportionment of its City Council districts. 75 Chen included a
claim that the City violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause by using total population as the basis for attaining
proportional representation between districts. 76 While the plaintiffs
acknowledged that the use of total population was not a per se violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, they argued that significantly large
concentrations of non-citizens in some districts created electoral
inequities between eligible voters in districts. 77 Thus, when total
population does not approximate the distribution of the voting eligible
population, officials are obligated to use a more exacting measurement. 78
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Chen from prior United States Supreme
Court's "one-person, one-vote" cases, and instead required jurisdictions
use a particular population base for redistricting. 79 Chen criticized the
Supreme Court as being "evasive in regard to which population base must
be equalized," and acknowledged the thorny tension between
representational equality (equal numbers of individuals per
representative) and electoral equality (equal numbers of voters per
representative).80
Advocates seeking to end prison-based gerrymandering contend that
counting prisoners where they physically reside for redistricting purposes
violates both representational and electoral equality.8!
It violates
representational equality because prisoners are not recognized as
residents of the prison's location in most jurisdictions. 82 Electoral
equality is violated by the fact that these prisoners cannot vote. 83
Additionally, large concentrated populations of non-voters generally
distort a district's relative voting strength. 84

Id.
Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d. 502 (5th Cir. 2000).
/d.
76 Id. at 523.
77 Id. at 522.
78 Id. at 524.
79 Id. at 524-525; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see generally Burns, 384 U.S.
73.
80 Chen, 206 F.3d at 524.
81 Ho, supra note 17, at 383.
82 Id. at 384.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 394.
73

74
75
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The only thing federal courts have made clear regarding acceptable
apportionment population bases for redistricting is that the matter is
simply not settled. Interestingly, the Supreme Court hinted that it is
agnostic when it comes to picking and choosing what qualifies as
acceptable and what does not, since such decisions are so deeply
entwined with more political notions of representation. 85 For now, it
seems the federal bar is more willing to judge the procedural aspects of a
jurisdiction's choice of population base when it comes to assessing
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the choice
itself.
Maryland's "No Representation without Population" Act requires that
population counts used for creating legislative districts exclude current
inmates who were not state residents prior to their incarceration. 86
Inmates who are state residents must be counted as residents at their last
known address. 87 The Act, enacted in 2010, was broadly supported by
the civil rights community in the state, with several prominent civil rights
organizations testifying on its behalf. 88
In Maryland, as in so many other states, the issue of whether to
include prison populations was a practical one. Heavily AfricanAmerican jurisdictions in the state, namely Baltimore City and Prince
George's County, had been on a population slide since the 2000 Census. 89
When the Act was adopted, it was very likely that those regions would
85 Burns, 384 U.S. at 92 ("Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has this
Court suggested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or
temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, in the apportionment
base by which their legislators are distributed and against which compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause is to be measured. The decision to include or exclude any such group
involves choices about the nature of representation with which we have been shown no
constitutionally founded reason to interfere.").
86 No Representation Without Population Act, ch. 67, 2010 Md. Laws 737, 739. These
districts include both Congressional and General Assembly legislative districts; along with
districts used for county and municipal governing bodies. !d.
87 !d.
88 Such organizations included the A.c.L.U., the Somerset County N.A.A.C.P., and the
Maryland Legislative Black Caucus. See Press Release, Somerset County NAACP, SB 400No Representation Without Population Act (March 4,2010), available at
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgltestimony/Somerset_NAACP_ MD_ SB400_March _4_20
1O.pdf; see Press Release, Somerset County ACLU, SB 400 - No Representation Without
Population Act (March 4, 2010), available at
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgltestimony/ACLU_MD_ SB400_March_4_20 I O.pdf;
Letter from Del. Veronica Turner, Chair, Legis. Black Caucus of Md., Inc., to the Hon. Joan
Carter Conway, Chair, Md. Sen. Educ., Health and Envtl. Matters Comrn. (March 4, 20 I 0),
available at
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgitestimonylLegislative_Black_Caucus_ MD_ SB400_Mar
ch_4_201O.pdf.
89 MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, supra note 14, at 52, 79; see MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, REPORT OF
MD. PRECINCT POPULATION DATA: 2000 CENSUS, MD. CENSUS POPULATION COUNT at 8-16,8186.
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lose representation in the legislature because of population decline. 90
Counting prisoners at their previous horne addresses would mitigate some
of this loss, although at the time, no one could be sure how much. 91
However, African-American residents of Maryland's Somerset County
had a more specific and weighty concern.92 During hearings on the Act,
Somerset County residents testified that the county's five-member
commission had never elected an African-American preferred candidate,
despite the county's 42% African-American population and a 70%
African-American commissioner district. 93 The culprit is the Eastern
Correctional Institution ("ECI"), established in 1987, which houses
approximately 3,000 prisoners and accounts for 70% of the district's
population. 94 As witnesses pointed out during testimony, their majorityminority district was only majority black "on paper.,,95 Somerset, being a
perfect example of the so-called prison gerrymandered district, was key
in ushering in corrective prisoner reallocation legislation in Maryland. 96
While the No Representation without Population Act was a major
victory for various constituencies, its language did not address the
gargantuan task of actually implementing prisoner reallocation
procedures. 97 Approximately one hundred local jurisdictions around the
country have engaged in prisoner reallocation, but Maryland became the
first to implement these procedures statewide. 98 State officials will have
to review and verify address records from thirty-three state and federal
facilities in the state; geocode these addresses for inclusion in a database;
and then subsequently "adjust" the 2010 U.S. Census data record-byrecord. 99
Annie Linskey, Baltimore Loses Clout in Redistricting, BALT. SUN, Dec. 16,2011,
http://articles.baltimoresun.coml20 11-12-16/news/bs-md-legis-redistrict-20 111214_1_mapmajority-african-american-districts-legislative-session.
91 See Ending Prison-Based Gerrymandering would Aid the African American Vote in
Maryland, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orglfactsheets/mdlafricanamericans.pdf.
92 Somerset County NAACP, supra note 88.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. "Majority-minority district" a is term of art usually understood to mean "districts where
a racial minority comprises a voting majority in an electoral district." REDISTRICTING LAW
2010, supra note 43 at 227.
96 See Maryland Law Brings Long-Awaited Racial Justice to Somerset County, PRISONERS OF
THE CENSUS (Aug. 15,2012),
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orglnewsI20 12/08/ 16/somerset-heraldl.
97 Defendant's Memorandum and Motion to Dismiss at 1-4, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp.
2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) (Case 8:II-cv-03220-RWT).
98 Inside Maryland Politics: Counting Maryland's Prisoners, WYPR,
http://www.wypr.orglnews/inside-maryland-politics-counting-maryland-prisoners (last visited
Jan. 20, 2013). See also Local Govt's That Avoid Prison Based Gerrymandering, PRISONERS
OF THE CENSUS, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgilocaV (last visited Oct. 8,2012).
99 See generally No Representation Without Population Act, ch. 67, sec. I, §8-701, sec. 2-2A01, art. 24 §I-III 2010 Md. Laws (local jails were exempted from the Act).
90
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Address records of prisoners were reviewed as they existed on the date
the Census was taken, April I, 20 I 0, to mirror the census data. loo As one
might expect, many of these records were far from complete or
accurate. 101 Address collection is not the top priority of prison intake
officers. Accordingly, state officials began with a database of over
twenty-thousand inmate names and addresses, many of which needed to
be corrected, formatted, or supplemented before they were usable under
the Act. 102 Verification and formatting of proper Maryland addresses was
crucial for the geocoding process, which involves pinpointing the precise
geographic location of an address via longitude and latitude; a necessity
for the actual census data adjustment process. 103
The address verification process brought about a series of policy and
practice questions critical to the integrity of the process, most important
of which was how to treat prisoners with no obtainable address. For
various reasons, addresses were not obtainable for some prisoners: such
as rural routes, post office boxes, missing house numbers, homelessness,
or no address listed. l04 The state adopted regulations to ensure uniformity
in dealing with each of these situations; and those regulations established
clear procedures for correcting address information, along with deadlines
for completing the geocoding. l05 Generally, after "reasonable efforts" are
made to obtain address information, prisoners with unobtainable
addresses were given the address of the institution where they were
currently incarcerated. l06
Perhaps the most unexpected challenge that faced state officials during
the reallocation process was the Federal Bureau of Prisons' refusal to
submit inmate address information for federal prisons located in
Maryland. l07 Citing privacy concerns, the Department of Justice refused
the Maryland Attorney General's repeated attempts to obtain the needed
Federal inmate address data. \08 The result was a stalemate that
effectively excluded federal prisoners from the entire reallocation
process. 109

100 Dec!. of James Cannistra, Ex. 2 at 1, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md.
2011)(Case: 8:11-cv-03220-RWT).
101 [d. at 2.
102 Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14, at 2.
103 Act of Aug. 13,2010, ch. 472, § 1,2011 De!. Acts (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. Tit.
29 § 804A (2011». Delaware passed a similar law to Maryland but found the process to be
too cumbersome and expensive for the 2010 redistricting cycle. [d. Delaware amended their
law in May of 20 II to take effect for the 2020 cycle. /d.
104 Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14, at 3.
105 MD. CODE REGS. 34.05.01.04 (2010).
106 [d.
107 Dec!. of James Cannistra, supra note 100, at 3.
108 [d. at 4.
109 See Dec!. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14, at 3.
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The heart of the prisoner reallocation process is the actual
modification of the database containing the official 2010 U.S. Census
data's hard count of the population. I \0 This involves modifying the total
population counts of individual census blocks by extracting prisoners
from the location of the prison, and adding them to the census blocks
where their home address is located. I I I In the end, state officials
reviewed over twenty-two thousand prisoner address records, and
modified over ten-thousand census block totals. 112 The final adjustment
of Census data resulted in a population deduction of one thousand, three
hundred and twenty one nonresident prisoners from the official U.S.
Census count for Maryland. I 13 Western Maryland's population count was
reduced by a total of seven thousand, three hundred and sixty five
individuals who were reallocated or moved to their previous home
address. I 14 Most of these previous home addresses were located in
Baltimore and the Washington, D.C. suburbs. 115
Despite the arduous process of reallocation, the end result did not
significantly change the state's demographics. 116 The nearly seventeen
thousand reallocated prisoners represented only 0.3% of the state's
population. ll7 Under the U.S. Supreme Court's "one-person, one-vote"
cases, it appears that Maryland's Census data adjustment process
"approximates" the standard census data totals for the state. This fact
likely influenced the court's view when considering the legal challenge
against the congressional map drawn using its numbers. I 18
Maryland, like most other states, redraws its Congressional districts
every ten years.119 But, unlike other states, Maryland's governor is given
the first crack at redrawing the map.120 The highly unusual step is not a
legal requirement, but a tradition. 121 Maryland's Constitution only
requires the governor to submit a legislative redistricting map to the
General Assembly on a pre-determined date. 122 The governor's proposed
110

III
112

1\3
114

Seeld. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 3-4.
2010 Adjusted Census Population, MD DEPT. OF PLANNING, available at

http://www.planning.maryland.govIPDFlRedistrictingl201 OdocslAdL2010_Tot]op_by_ MD
CntyReg.pdf, (last visited Oct. 11,2012).
115

Id.

Decl, of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14 at 3-4.
Id. During the process 16,988 prisoners were relocated, bringing the adjusted total
~opulation for Maryland to 5,772, 231. Id.
18 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 893-94.
119 MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5.
120 Id.
121 Redistricting Process in Maryland, MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY REAPPORTIONMENT
116

117

AND REDISTRICTING, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/OtherlRedistrictinglRedistricting.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2013).
122 MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5.
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map then automatically becomes law, unless a supermajority comprised
of both chambers of the General Assembly enact an alternative legislative
redistricting map within forty-five days. 123
The Maryland state constitution does not refer to drawing U.S.
Congressional districts, thus the U.S. Constitution leaves the General
Assembly with jurisdiction over this matter. 124 Despite the General
Assembly's authority to establish Congressional districts for the state, the
governor has traditionally introduced a Congressional redistricting map in
companion to the state legislative map.125 However, the General
Assembly has greater latitude to accept or reject the governor's proposed
Congressional map.126 The General Assembly may, at any time, pass an
alternative plan or accept the governor's proposal by a majority vote. 127
Part of the reason for the gubernatorial tradition of presenting the
legislature with the Congressional and state legislative redistricting maps
is due to the Maryland Constitution's public hearing requirement. 128
Article III, Section 5 of the Maryland Constitution requires the governor
to prepare the state legislative plan only after "public hearings.,,129 In
1974, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified this constitutional
language when it invalidated a state legislative map proposed by the
governor after one public hearing was held two days prior to its General
Assembly introduction. 130 The court found that a single public hearing
was not adequate, and the governor has since appointed an advisory
committee to hold pre-map and post-map hearings in order to comply
with the court's holding. 131 The General Assembly appears to be content
with the governor's process for legislative redistricting, and has
acquiesced to following the same process for Congressional
redistricting. 132
In July 2011, Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley appointed a five
member advisory committee to submit a map of proposed Congressional
Id.
See U.S. CaNST., art. I, § 4.
125 Overview a/the 2012 Census Redistricting Data Program, MD. DEPT. OF PLANNING,
available at http://planning.maryland.gov!PDFlRedistricting/201 Odocs/20 1OCensRedistdata
ProgOvrvw. pdf.
126 MD. CONST. art. III, § 5.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 In re Legislative Redistricting of the State, 271 Md. 320, 317 A.2d 477 (1974). See
Memorandum from William H. Adkins, II, Assistant Dir. of Dep't. of Legislative Reference,
Maryland Gen. Assembly to All Members of the General Assembly (Aug. 1, 1973) (on file
with author).
131 Press Release, Takirra Winfield, Governor O'Malley Announces Members of the
Governor's Redistricting Advisory Comm. (lUI. 4, 2011), available at
http://planning.maryland.gov!PDF!Press/pressRelease-RedistrictingCommittee07041I. pdf.
132 Redistricting Process in Maryland, supra note 121.
123

124
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districts. 133 This map was submitted after the committee held twelve
public hearings across the state, and in time for an October special
session of the General Assembly. 134 The General Assembly held this
special session in order to complete the Congressional redistricting
process in time for the Spring 2012 presidential primaries. 135 The
Governor's map featured a reconfigured Sixth Congressional District that
challenged the re-election prospects of the district's long-time Republican
incumbent Congressman. 136 It also made major changes to districts in
central Maryland and the Washington suburbs. 137 Legislators passed the
Governor's proposed map in a three-day session, which prompted the
filing of several lawsuits by discontented constituents. 138
The Maryland Constitution lists various standards and requirements
for drawing state legislative districts, including mandates to construct
compact districts or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions.139
However, it is silent in regards to Congressional redistricting, and thus
any and all legal constriction on Congressional redistricting exists in
Federal law. 140 Practically speaking, this means that there are no state
constitutional mandates for drawing Congressional district maps in
The only specific federal statutory requirement for
Maryland. 141
Congressional districts is that they be single-member. 142 Thus, the only
significant legal limitations on the drawing of Congressional districts in
Maryland are the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and federal case law
interpreting the U.S. Constitution, specifically, the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. 143
Takirra Winfield, supra note 131.
Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
135 Redistricting and Reapportionment, MD. DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERVS., available at
http://mlis.state.md.us/OtheriRedistricting/Redistricting.htm.
136 Abby Livingston, Maryland Legislature Passes Map Endangering Bartlett, ROLL CALL,
Oct. 19,2011.
137 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
138 !d. at 891.
139 MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5.
140 Redistricting and Reapportionment, supra note 135.
141 Id.
142 See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (1967) (stating that "there shall be established by law a number of
districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and
Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more
than one Representative. "). Before passage of the single-member district requirement, states
were free to elect some of its congressional representatives at-large under the
Reapportionment Act of 1929. See generally Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
143 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Fourteenth Amendment
requires that political districts be equal in population so that a single person's vote would be
weighed equally in any district); Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. H.R., 525 U.S. 316 (1999)
(Supreme Court held that reapportionment must be carried out using the Census Bureau's
actual enumeration and not statistically adjusted data provided by the Census); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (Supreme Court held that strict population equality is
required among congressional districts in each state); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 578
133

134
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The vast majority of legal challenges to redistricting plans fall into the
following categories: 1) equal population; 2) racial gerrymandering; 3)
political gerrymandering; and 4) violations of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. 144 The equal population requirement, which is the focus of this
article, stems from both Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (in
regards to Congressional districts), and the Fourteenth Amendment (for
legislative and other redistricting maps).145 Both racial and political
gerrymandering claims arise from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 146 Section two of the Voting Rights Act covers
minority vote dilution claims, as well as redistricting plans deemed to be
"retrogressive" to minority populations. 147 The Voting Rights Act bans
redistricting plans that purposely discriminate and have a discriminatory
effect on minorities. 148
The grievances claimed in lawsuits against Maryland's 2012
Congressional redistricting map included all of the above challenges. 149
Several plaintiffs, mostly minority residents from various regions of
Maryland, filed suit in Federal District Court and alleged the 2012
Congressional map discriminated against Maryland minority voters; was
an illegal partisan gerrymander; and violated the "One Person, One Vote"
equal population requirement. 15o Plaintiffs alleged that there were
various impermissible infractions against minority voters. 151 Chief
among these complaints was the manner that the map used to split
minority communities in the Baltimore and Prince George's County
areas. 152 The plaintiffs claimed that some minority communities were
split in order to create predominantly white districts, which the plaintiffs
argued was illegal racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 153 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that other minority
communities were submerged into majority white districts in order to
dilute the minority vote, and thus violated Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act. 154

(1964) (Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires States to "make an
honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of
equal population as is practicable.").
144 See generally, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43.
145 Redistricting and Reapportionment, supra note 135.
146 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
147 See generally REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43; RACIAL AND LANGUAGE
MINORITIES 51 (2009).
148 Jd.
149 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
150 Jd.
151 See generally, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (2011).
152 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
153 Jd. at 891-92.
154 Jd. at 897.

52

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 43.1

A three-judge panel of the United States District Court of Maryland
heard oral arguments on the above claims, and delivered their decision to
dispose of all of the plaintiffs' claims in Fletcher v. Lamone. 155 In
Fletcher, the court briefly reviewed and stated its rationale for dismissing
each claim. 156 Particularly noteworthy are the court's reasons for
rejecting the equal population challenge, which the court based on the
state's prisoner reallocation efforts. 157 Plaintiffs appealed the panel's
decision on the equal population challenge directly to the United States
Supreme Court, who denied the appeal and summarily affirmed the lower
court's decision.158 The Court's denial indicates how the Court views
census data adjustment for prison populations in the context of the Equal
Protection Clause and the "One Person, One Vote" principle. 159
Fletcher's racial gerrymandering claim focused on Congressional
Districts Three and Five. The plaintiffs described District Three as
containing "finger-like district lines [ ... [that] reach down into Baltimore
City snatching minority voters, [and] effectively grafting them into a
majority district within the suburbs.,,160 District Five, located in Prince
George's County, it claimed "bizarrely hooks left to split off minority
neighborhoods into three separate districts.,,161 This claim of intentional
racial discrimination via gerrymandering is based on a distinct group of
cases stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v.
Reno. 162 The Shaw line of cases recognized for the first time that voting
districts drawn in a way that is so bizarre that the shape itself can be
prima facie evidence of intentional discrimination, something the Court
described as drawing district boundaries using race as the primary and
controlling factor. 163
155 See Id. at 891. Plaintiffs in the case sued Linda Lamone, the head administrator of
Maryland's State Board of Elections. Id. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, a three-judge federal
district court panels has jurisdiction in all reapportionment and Voting Rights Act cases with
direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006).
156 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
157 Id. at 896-97.
158 Fletcher v. Lamone, 133 S.Ct. 29, 29 (2012).
159 Report of the Special Master, 2012 Legislative Redistricting of the State, Misc. Nos. 1,2,
3,4,5,9. Sept. Term, 2012, 3, n. 3 (Sept. 20, 2012) available at
https:lldocs.google.comlviewer?ur1=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.courts.state.md.us%2Fcoappeals
%2Fhighlightedcases%2F20 12districting%2Fspecialmastersreport. pdf.
160 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count
Three and Six of the Complaint at 16 Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011)
(No. 11-3220).
161 Id. at 18.
162 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
163 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Devel. Corp., 42 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) ("Redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on
its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race' demands the same close scrutiny
that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.")); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644 (citation
omitted). Ironically the Shaw line of cases comprised of white plaintiffs seeking redress for
bizarrely shaped minority-majority districts. In Fletcher, the plaintiffs are minorities.
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In Shaw's dicta, the Court noted that bizarrely shaped districts alone
were not necessarily evidence of racial discrimination, but that such
districts indicate that traditional districting principles were secondary to
racial concerns. 164 The Fletcher court reiterated this in its opinion and
conceded that several of Maryland's congressional districts were
"unusually odd.,,165 In particular, Congressional District Three was
-' "reminiscent of a broken-winged pterodactyl, lying prostrate across the
center of the state.,,166 Despite its failed aesthetics, the court found no
evidence of discriminatory intent. 167 The opinion noted broad support by
the African-American community, the substantial involvement of
African-Americans in the development of the map, and the relative
proportionality of majority African-American districts to their share of
the total population. 168
The Fletcher plaintiffs contended that the "bizarre" boundaries in
Maryland's 2012 Congressional District map not only indicated
intentional discrimination, but violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act by diluting the voting strength of African-Americans in the state as a
The Governor's map contained two African-American
whole. 169
minority-majority districts, District Four (53.72%) and District Seven
(53.75%).170 District Five was considered a minority "opportunity
district" with a 37% African-American population. l7l According to the
plaintiffs, three compact majority African-American districts could have

Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. The court has found unconstitutional racial gerrymanders
under the Fifteenth Amendment as early as 1960. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 354 U.S. 339
(1960). The Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson decisions were based on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 905; see Shaw, 509 U.S. at
630.
164 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
165 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 902 0 03. The Fletcher court was especially critical of the
Third Congressional District, and described the contours of the District in a footnote: "The
Third District is rated at or near the bottom of all congressional districts [nationally1in
multiple measures of statistical compactness." [d. at 902, n. 5.
166 [d. at 902.
167 [d. at 897.
168 Id. at 902. Two African-American majority districts make up twenty-five percent of the
state's eight districts. [d. African-Americans makeup twenty-eight percent of the total
Eopulation in the state. [d.
69 PI.'s Mem. in SUpp. of its Mot. for Prelim. Inj. as to Count Three and Six of the Compl.,
sUfra note 162, at 23.
17 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
171 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count
Three and Six of the Compl., supra note 162, at 18. See also, Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 902
("The State Plan also creates two districts, the Second and the Fifth, with significant and
growing minority populations. Assuming population trends remain consistent, both of these
districts could conceivably elect minority candidates on the basis of majority/minority
coalition voting").
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been drawn given the total African-American population of Maryland. 172
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that maximizing the
number of minority-majority districts in a plan is not required under the
Voting Rights Act or any other law, a state could be required to draw an
additional minority-majority district where there has been a finding of
minority vote dilution. 173
The U.S. Supreme Court established a three-pronged preliminary test
in Thornburg v. Gingles to determine when a vote dilution claim is
valid. 174 Generally, a vote dilution claim is established when (1) racially
polarized voting persists; (2) the minority group in question is politically
cohesive; and (3) the group can form a relatively compact district that
will allow them to elect candidates of their choosing.1 75 The analysis to
determine vote dilution under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act can
be performed by the officials responsible for redistricting or other
stakeholders, but the determination almost always ends up in court for
review. 176
The Fletcher plaintiffs offered evidence to satisfy the three Gingles
factors, which the court found lacking.l77 First, Plaintiffs submitted
alternative maps that showed that a third, compact African-American
congressional district could have been easily drawn in Maryland. 178
Presumably, this went to prove that the minority population was
politically cohesive and could be formed in a compact district, but the
court took exception to this evidence and noted that compactness, in the
context of Section Two, requires more than analysis of the shape of the
proposed third district, but "compactness of the minority population
itself.,,179 The Fletcher majority found that the state actually only had
two distinct concentrations of African-Americans, one in the Baltimore

172 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count
Three and Six of the Compl., supra note 162, at 16.
173 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,909 (1996). States have drawn majority-minority
districts of varying shapes and compactness after determining that not drawing them would
violate either section 2 or section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id.
174 See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
175 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. One of the Supreme Court's more steadfast rules are the socalled Gingles factors. To make a prima facie case of minority vote dilution, minority
plaintiffs must show "[they are] sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district ... [are] politically cohesive, ... and the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id.
176 REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43 at 129 ("The trend toward litigation in state
and federal courts continued from the 1990s, with a total of 41 states experiencing
litigation in either state or federal courts, if not both. Of considerable interest, 28 states
experienced some litigation in state court related to legislative redistricting. and an
additional 19 had some state litigation related to congressional redistricting.").
177 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 898-99.
178 Id. at 897-98.
179 Id. at 899.
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region and the other in suburban Washington, D.C. ISO Any map with a
third African-American majority congressional district would have to
combine African-Americans from these two distinct areas. lSI While the
Plaintiffs attempted to show homogeneity among both regions, the court
disagreed, noting that "the differences between the two areas are real." IS2
The court pointed out stark differences in the industry, culture and media
markets of the Baltimore and Washington areas, and rejected the notion
that they together "form a single community of interest."IS3
The Fletcher plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claim identified the
five congressional districts comprising the Western Maryland, Central
Maryland and Baltimore regions as unconstitutional gerrymanders. IS4
The Plaintiffs offered evidence that showed the district map was drawn to
ensure a seven-to-one Democrat Party majority in the state's
Congressional delegation. ls5 Because there is no specific precedent
suggesting that partisan motives violate the u.s. Constitution, and there is
no state or federal statute barring political motive when drawing
Congressional boundaries, the plaintiffs could only rely on the Supreme
Court's fragile majority in Vieth v. Jubelirer. IS6 That case continued to
recognize the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, despite
having utterly failed to establish an analytical framework from which it
can intelligently identify an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 187
Indeed, a plurality of the Vieth court lamented that there were "no
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims. "IS8
The Fletcher court similarly found no reliable standard by which to
adjudicate the partisan gerrymandering claim.ls9 To persuade the
Id.
Id. at 897.
182 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 899. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC) found that two geographically separated Latino
populations within a Texas majority-minority district were also socially distinct. League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,435 (2006). Thus, section two of the
Voting Rights Act would not be satisfied by putting the two very different groups together in
one district. See id. at 433-34.
183 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 899-900 (also finding plaintiffs' proof of racially
polarized voting lacking). Id. The court noted "high levels of white support for minority
candidates in several races" and only "moderate" or occasional racial block voting." Id.
184 Plaintiff's Complaint at 15, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) (No.
11-3220). The analysis to determine vote dilution under Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act is commonly performed by the officials responsible for redistricting or other stakeholders
to assess their legal liability when formulating redistricting plans and courts have amassed a
considerable body of precedent on the analysis required to support a Section Two claim.
REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43 at 64.
185 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
186 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
187 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); see also Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
188 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
189 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
180
181
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Fletcher panel that the map's overriding goal was to increase partisan
strength, plaintiffs relied only on Justice Stevens' dissent in Vieth. 190
Despite Justice Stevens' position, it is well established that the Court has
never considered political motivation by itself to be a suspect motive in
redistricting. 191 The judiciary's acquiescence to the political nature of
redistricting is much of the reason why redistricting map controversies
were considered non-justiciable until Baker v. Carr. 192
"One Person, One Vote" decisions by courts since Baker v. Carr have
two parallel tracks by which the population equality standard for
congressional redistricting plans are separate and distinct from that of
legislative or other local electoral bodies' plans. 193 The Supreme Court
first articulated this difference in standards in Wesberry v. Sanders. 194
The reason for the difference can be found in the origin of the law that
requires it. The Court's equal population requirement for legislative
plans emanates from its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. 195 Additionally, Article I, Section Two of the
U.S. Constitution specifically requires that representatives be apportioned
among the several states "according to their respective numbers.,,196
This difference, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, results in a
substantially equal population standard for state and local legislative
bodies; and a strict equality population standard for congressional
districts. 197 The stricter congressional standard points back to the direct
Constitutional mandate, while the Court created the substantially equal
standard. 198 The difference or variance between congressional district
population totals must be minimal in order to avoid scrutiny by the
courts. 199
The Fletcher plaintiffs' equal population claim relied on the
assumption that the state used impermissibly adjusted U.S. Census
data. 20o Thus, Maryland's 2012 Congressional Districts were severely

190 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count
Three and Six of the Compi., supra note 162, at 22.
191 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
192 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198; but see Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
193 See generally Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973).
194 Wesberry v, Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964).
195 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1973).
196 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
197 Howell, 410 U.S. at 322 ("Thus whereas population alone has been the sole criterion of
constitutionality in congressional redistricting under Art. I, § 2, broader latitude has been
afforded the States under the Equal Protection Clause in state legislative redistricting [ ... ] The
dichotomy between the two lines of cases has consistently been maintained").
198 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 569 ("[T]he overriding objective must be substantial equality.").
199 Howell, 410 U.S. at 320-22; see, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 742-51 (1973)
(discussing state legislative redistricting plans where the difference or variance between
district totals is 7.83%).
200 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
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mal-apportioned and in violation of the strict equality standard. 201
According to the plaintiffs, if the total unadjusted population count from
the Census was used, District Six is the biggest offender, with six
thousand, nine hundred and nineteen persons over the ideal population
tota1. 202 District Seven was the second largest offender, with four
thousand, six hundred and sixty-seven persons under the idea1. 203 On the
other hand, when the variance of the district is calculated based on
adjusted data, the districts are perfectly balanced, to within one person in
most districts.z 04
The simple question of the case becomes whether Article I, Section
Two requires the State of Maryland to use the traditional, unadjusted data
set from the U.S. Census Bureau. 205 The plaintiffs read Karcher's "best
population data available" standard, discussed above, as requiring use of
unadjusted census data. 206 The Fletcher court, however, chided the
plaintiffs for failing to acknowledge the full context of Karcher;
specifically that Karcher acknowledged that Census data could be
modified to correct perceived flaws. 207
The Fletcher majority also seemed to extract further meaning from
First, Fletcher
both Karcher and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler. 208
acknowledged that census data should be used as a starting point, at least
in congressional redistricting. 209 Second, Fletcher stated that any
adjustments must be documented and uniformly implemented. 2lO Both
Id. at 893.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to
Count Three and Six of the Complaint, supra note 162, at 4.
203 See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Fletcher v.

201

202

Lamone 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) (No. 11-3220) (A district's "ideal" population is
determined by simply dividing the total population of a jurisdiction and dividing it by the
number districts to be drawn); MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, REPORT OF MD. PRECINCT
POPULATION DATA: 2010 CENSUS, ADJUSTED MD. REDISTRICTING DATA & UNADJUSTED
CENSUS POPULATION COUNT, App. A-3 (2010). available at
http://www.mdp.state.md.usIPDFlRedistricting/20 1Odatalprecinct/AppA3 _ Adj. pdf. Before
adjusting for prisoners, Maryland's total population was 5,773,552. Id. Its ideal
congressional district population would have been 721,694. Id. After prisoner adjustment, the
two numbers respectively were 5,772,231 and 721,529. /d. Seven districts in the
Congressional map at issue have a population equal to the ideal, and District Eight contained
one person less due to the odd state total. Id.
204 See MD. DEP'T. OF PLANNING, MD. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, DEMOGRAPHIC TABLES:
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS By COUNTY: POPULATION By RACE (2010), available at
http://www.planning.maryland.govIPDFlRedistricting120 1Odatalmd20 11_congressional_sum
maryJeportOct2011.pdf.
205 Fletcher. 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95.
206 Id. at 894; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
207 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 738)
208 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95 (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31, 53435;Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732, n. 4, 738).
209 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
210 Id. at 894-95.
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requirements show the court's concern for accuracy and reliability of the
data being used, and echo the sentiments of past decisions that the best
available data usually includes Census data in some form?11 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has long loathed to endorse voter registration as an
acceptable population base but noted its close approximation to census
data 212
Fletcher then stated that the second part of the data question was
Karcher's requirement that the adjusted data be relevant and
systematically applied. 213 The Fletcher majority pointed to the state's
regulatory framework for reallocation and the well-documented process
for obtaining, geocoding and adjusting the data. 214 The plaintiffs did not
challenge the states' reallocation process, but did suggest the state's
actions were insufficient. 215 Plaintiffs argued that if Maryland could
legally adjust its census data to reallocate prisoners, it would have to do
the same for other similarly situated, transient populations in the state. 216
Because the state did not address these comparable populations, its
actions did not fulfill Karcher's requirement that adjustments in
systematic manner?17
The court confirmed that Karcher's endorsement of improved census
data should not be read as a requirement for states to improve census data
whenever possible. A Federal District Court in San Antonio, Texas, took
a similar view in an unreported case regarding the State of Texas's failure
to reallocate the state's prisoners before redistricting. 218 Reallocation is
consistent with equal population principles, but is not a requirement. 219
Thus, the best data available standard does not mean the best data
possible standard.
The Fletcher plaintiffs appealed the court's ruling as it pertained to
their equal population claim to the U.S. Supreme Court.220 In June of
2012, the court summarily affirmed the lower court's decision.221 During
the summer of 2012, opponents of the map launched a successful
Id. at 895 (citing City of Detroit v. Franklin, 4 F.3d 1367 (6th Cir.1993)).
Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 95 (1966).
213 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
214 See id. ("The question remains whether Maryland's adjustments to census data were made
in the systematic manner demanded by Karcher. It seems clear to us that they were.").
'215 Id.
216 Id. ("If Maryland wishes to correct for prisoner-related population distortions, it must also
make similar adjustments to account for the distortionary effects of college students and
members of the military.").
217 Id.
218 !d. at 895 (quoting Perez v. Texas, No. ll-Ca-360-0LG-JES-XR, slip op. at 24 (W.O.
Tex. Sept. 2, 2011) ("[T]he State could enact a constitutional amendment or statute that
modifies the count of prisoners as residents of whatever county they lived in prior to
incarceration .. , [but] there is no federal requirement to do so.").
219 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 898-900.
220 See generally Fletcher v. Lamone, No. 11-1178,2012 WL 1030482 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
221 !d. at *1.
211

212
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campaign to petition the new congressional map to referendum. 222 In
July of 2012, the State Board of Elections certified the required number
of signatures needed to place the redistricting question on Maryland's
2012 election ballots. 223 In the 2012 general election, Maryland voters
approved of the re-drawn districts. 224
The Fletcher decision cemented the notion espoused by the voting
rights cognoscenti that prisoner reallocation corrects distortions in
electoral representation rather than magnifying them. What Fletcher did
not do was endorse it as a requirement. 225 Instead, the Fletcher court took
the middle-ground, reaffirming the role that state public policy plays in
the redistricting process. 226
Fletcher recognized prisoner reallocation as a rational public policy
that states can employ in the redistricting process. 227 Prison populations
distort representation, but not to the extent that it burdens equal
representation rights protected by Article I, Section Two of the
Constitution.228 Legitimate state policies that properly correct for this
distortion in the redistricting process are permitted, but not mandated. 229
The Fletcher decision is a significant progression for a subject that has
not seen much groundbreaking judicial interpretation since Shaw v.
Reno. 230 The decision preserves the historical prominence of Census data
in redistricting, while acknowledging the growth and role technology can
play in a state's quest for the best data available. 231
Courts and court watchers have long complained that redistricting is
rife with political bedlam, some of which is the result of a healthy
democratic system, and some that is rife with rancor and ineffectiveness.
Maryland redistricting maps have had their share of judicial scrutiny over
the years, and, as is the case with the great majority of redistricting
controversies, courts must weigh the delicate balance between the healthy
political prerogatives of the line drawer and the rules that keep them in
check. Here, the court found no foul with the state's exercise of its
222 Earl Kelly & Pamela Wood, Judge OKs Referendum on Congressional Map, CAPITAL
GAZETTE, (Annapolis, MD), Aug. 11,2012, at AI.
223 Letter from Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Md. State Bd. Of Elections, to Neil Parrott,
Delegate (July 20, 2012) (certifying 59,201 signatures) (on file with author).
224 Holly Nunn, Redistricting Withstands Ballot Challenge, Maps Upheld, THE GAZETTE
(Gaithersburg, MD), Nov. 6,2012,
http://www.gazette.netlarticle/20 1211 06INEWS1711 079552/-llredistricting-withstands-ballotchallenge-maps-upheld&template=gazette.
225 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 899-901.
226 Id. at 903.
227 Id. at 897.
228 Nathaniel Persily, supra note 1, at 786-89.
229 Id. at 788.
230 See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (recognizing a cause of action under the
Equal Protection Clause for white voters in oddly shaped majority-minority districts).
231 See generally Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
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prerogatives. 232 More importantly, the Fletcher decision solidified
Maryland's success as the test case for prisoner reallocation policies
nationwide.

232

!d. at 904.

